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- Perceptions Of Benevolence And The Design Of Agency Contracts: Ceo-tmt Relationships In Family Firms
Perceptions of benevolence and the design of agency contracts: CEO-TMT relationships in family firms
Perceptions of benevolence and the design of agency contracts: CEO-TMT relationships in family firms
Date
30/11/2017
Author(s)
Authors: Cristina Cruz, LR Gómez-Mejia, M Becerra
Organization
Academy of Management Journal 53 (1), 69-89
Publication Type
Academic Research
Using a sample of 122 Spanish family-owned firms , we analyzed the determinants and consequences of the presence of trust in executive contracts in family firms. Our findings proved that high level of trust of the CEO in the Top Management Team reduces the pay-performance sensitivity of executive compensation for both, family and nonfamily executives although the effect is stronger for the former than for the latter.